Buyer-seller watermarking protocols incorporate digital watermarking with cryptography, in order to protect digital copyrights and privacy rights for the seller and the buyer before, during, and after purchase activities in e-commerce.
Introduction and problem statement
Recent proliferation and success of the Internet, together with the availability of various web services based applications such as multimedia and e-commerce, has created an environment where it became very easy to obtain, replicate and distribute digital content without any loss in quality. It brings convenience and improves the efficiency of online purchase activities between buyers and sellers. On the other hand, it also brings threats of illegal replications and distributions at ease. Therefore, intellectual property rights protection has become a great concern. Encryption and digital watermarking have been developed as promising techniques for copyright protection. Encryption can be used to prevent unauthorized access to digital content, but it has the limitation that once a content is decrypted, it doesn't prevent an authorized user from illegally replicating the digital content. Digital watermarking [6] has been proposed, complementing encryption techniques, to establish and prove ownership rights by embedding the seller's information in the redistributed content. Similar to digital watermarking, fingerprinting techniques can be used to trace copyright violators by embedding the buyer's information in the redistributed content. Earlier research on fingerprinting schemes have been conducted by Pfitzmann et al. [18, 17, 15, 16] , and by Camenisch et al. [4] . The shortcoming of these schemes lies in their inefficiency. Some schemes [18, 17] are based on secure two-party computations, which require a too high complexity to implement in practice. Other schemes [15, 16] are based on coin-based constructions, using a building block of the c-secure fingerprinting code by Boneh et al. [3] , which require too long codes for embedding and hence the overall system is not practical to implement in real life applications.
A buyer-seller watermarking protocol is one that combines encryption, digital watermarking, and other techniques to ensure rights protection for both the buyer and the seller in e-commerce. The first known buyer-seller watermark protocol was introduced by Memon et al. [13] , and it was improved by Ju et al. [10] . Since the first introduction of the concept, several alternative design solutions have been proposed in [9, 8, 12, 20, 19] . A complete and sound buyer-seller watermarking protocol is expected to solve the following problems: The piracy tracing problem. The seller should be able to trace and identify the copyright violator. The customer's rights problem. When a watermark is inserted solely by the seller, the seller may benefit from framing attacks to an innocent buyer. The unbinding problem. The seller may fabricate piracy by transplanting the buyer's watermark into other contents. The anonymity problem. The buyer should be anonymous during transactions until he is adjudicated to be guilty. The conspiracy problem. Malicious parties may collude with each other and mount attacks to frame an innocent buyer or to confound the tracing by removing the watermark from the digital content. The dispute problem. The arbitrator should be able to resolve disputes, without the buyer revealing his identity or private key. 
Analysis of the existing work
Due to the space limit, instead of a full security analysis, we summarize the analysis and point out the shortcomings of each previous protocols [13, 10, 9, 8, 12, 20, 19] . The piracy tracing problem and the customer's rights problem are solved in the early schemes. The existing solutions to the following problems are either impractical or incomplete. The unbinding problem. Lei et al [12] point out the unbinding problem in [13, 10, 9, 8] and improve by providing a mechanism to bind a specific transaction to a specific buyer. The similar design principle is applied by Zhang et al. [20] and Shao et al. [19] . The conspiracy problem. Goi et al. in [8] point out that the schemes of [13, 10, 9] are vulnerable against conspiracy attacks, and show that the protocol's security shouldn't rely on any third party. Zhang et al. [20] apply the principle of [8] and ensure that the buyer's watermark is generated by the buyer, instead of a watermark certificate authority (WCA). According to our analysis, we conclude that the protocols by Lei et al. [12] and Shao et al. [19] cannot resist the conspiracy attack, where a malicious seller can collude with a third party, such that the seller can discover the buyer's watermark. The anonymity problem. Memon's protocol [13] requires the seller to know the buyer's identity to carry out a transaction. [10, 9] improve [13] by applying an anonymous key pair in each transaction. However, both protocols require the WCA to know the buyer's identity, which means that the buyer's anonymity is not preserved against conspiracy attacks. In [8] , the buyer is required to request a signature from the certification authority (CA) of the public key infrastructure (PKI) to generate a watermark. However, [8] cannot solve the anonymity problem efficiently, since before each transaction, the buyer has to contact the CA for a new signature. [12, 20, 19] apply anonymous certificates, i.e., digital certificates without real identities of applicants. Unfortunately, transaction unlinkability is not provided: during all transactions, the anonymous certificate stays the same, unless the buyer contacts the CA before each transaction for a new certificate, which is impractical for real life applications. The dispute problem. In order to resolve disputes, [13, 9, 8, 20 ] all require the accused but possible innocent buyer to reveal his identity or private key. Moreover, these protocols don't operate properly if the underlying cryptosystem is probabilistic, because the data encrypted by the judge or the CA may not be equal to the data provided by the seller. In [10] , the buyer creates a key escrow cipher to escrow his anonymous private key at the judge. The problem is that the buyer's secrecy would not be protected against conspiracy attacks if the judge was malicious. In [12] , the judge requests the buyer's watermark from the WCA, and hence the security depends on the trustworthiness of the WCA.
Our approach
From the above analysis, we show that none of the existing protocols fulfills the design requirements. Our approach improves on the shortcomings of the existing protocols in order to achieve all the desired security properties simultaneously. A comparison of the proposed protocol with the existing buyer-seller watermarking protocols, in accordance with the protocol design requirements, is depicted in Table  1 .1. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we briefly review some underlying cryptographic primitives. In Sec. 3, we define the system model with assumptions and discuss the proposed protocol. In Sec. 4, we analyze the security of the proposed protocol and explain how the design goals are fulfilled. We conclude in Sec. 5.
Cryptographic primitives

Privacy homomorphism
A privacy homomorphism refers to a cryptosystem E which is homomorphic with respect to some binary operators M in the plaintext space M and C in the ciphertext space C, such that
. Homomorphic cryptosystems can be classified as the ones whose security relies on the "decisional composite residuosity assumption" (DCRA), and the ones of the ElGamal class based on "decisional DiffieHellman assumption" (DDH). The Paillier cryptosystem [14] , and the Damgård-Jurik cryptosystem [11] are additive privacy homomorphisms.
Group signature
Group signatures enable group members, each with own private signature key, to produce signatures on behalf of the group. The security properties of group signatures are formalized as follows [1, 2] : Anonymity allows group members to create signatures anonymously, such that it is hard for an adversary, not in possession of the group manager's opening key to recover the identity of the signer. Traceability permits the signer's anonymity to be revoked by the group manager in case of misuse, and ensures that no colluded group members can create unverifiable signatures, or signatures that can't be traced back to some member of the coalition. Non-frameability requires that no adversary can produce a signature in the name of a user unless the latter indeed produced it.
Verifiable encryption
Verifiable encryption schemes enable the encrypter to ensure that the plaintext satisfies certain applicationdependent properties without compromising the secrecy. It can be employed in numerous applications for group signature and identity escrow, and digital payment with revocable anonymity, etc. Specific schemes are proposed in [5] for both discrete-log based and factoring based schemes.
3 Proposed scheme
System model
The proposed protocol involves four entities, a copyright holder and seller Alice, a buyer Bob, a group manager GM, and a judge J. Notations are explained in Table  3 .1. We define the following assumptions in the proposed scheme. Without these assumptions, the security properties of the proposed scheme cannot be guaranteed. We assume a PKI is available, such that each entity has a public and private key pair certified by the CA. We assume the GM is as trustworthy as the CA, and consists of a trusted party for group key generation, an issuer for group member joining, and an opener for group signature opening. Furthermore, the GM is the only party who knows the link between the buyer's anonymous key and identity. We assume that the digital content is a still image. Our protocol employs the privacy homomorphism of the Paillier cryptosystem [14] and the robust collusion resistance watermarking technique proposed by Cox et al. [6] . Our protocol incorporates secure group signatures [2] to ensure anonymity and traceability, together with anonymous communication networks, such as T or [7] , to enable both anonymous outgoing connections and anonymous hidden services. We also assume that all messages are transferred in a secure communication channel.
Registration protocol
The registration protocol, performed between the buyer Bob and the GM, is depicted in Fig. 1 .
In the group-key generation phase, the GM generates a triple (gpk, ok, ik), with the group public key gpk to verify signatures, the issuing key ik to issue signature keys for users, and the opening key ok to open signatures. In order to join the group, Bob generates a public and private key pair (upk B , usk B ) and a signing and verification key pair (sk B , pk B ). Bob creates a signature sig B on pk B with usk B , and sends sig B and pk B to the GM. The GM verifies Bob's signature, issues Bob a certificate cert B , and stores sig B , pk B in the registration table Reg. After Bob receives the certificate cert B from the GM, he generates the group member signature key gsk B from the tuple (B, pk B , sk B , cert B ).
Watermark generation and insertion protocol
The watermark generation and insertion protocol, as depicted in Fig. 2 , can be executed multiple times for multiple transactions between the seller Alice and the buyer Bob. Alice and Bob first negotiate a purchase agreement ARG on rights and specifications of the digital content X. Hence ARG uniquely binds a particular transaction to the item of interest X. Bob generates a one-time anonymous public and private key pair (pk * B , sk * B ), and creates a group signature µ on pk * B with Bob's group signature key gsk B , µ = GSig(gpk, gsk B , pk * B ). Bob computes an escrow cipher E esc = E pk GA (sk * B ) to recover Bob's private key sk * B from the GM in case of disputes. The verifiable proof pf sk * B for E esc is to assure Alice that the encrypted message is valid without compromising sk * B . In each transaction, Bob generates his watermark W , in compliance with the features of the content X for robustness, and encrypts W using pk * B as ew B = E pk * B (W pri B ). Then Bob sends (pk * B , µ, ARG, ew B , pf sk * B , E esc ) together with his signature ν to Alice.
Alice first verifies Bob's signature ν, the verifiable proof pf sk * B , and Bob's group signature µ with the group public key gpk. Alice generates her watermark V in compliance with the features of X and embeds V to X, resulting in the intermediate watermarked content as X = X ⊕ V . Figure 1 . The registration protocol performed between Bob and the GM.
Group manager (GM)
-3. obtain X with sk * B Figure 2 . The watermark generation and insertion protocol performed between Alice and Bob.
Then she generates a random permutation function σ to permute the elements of the encrypted W , as σ(E pk * B (W )) = E pk * B (σ(W )). Next, Alice performs the second watermark embedding in the encrypted domain by applying privacy homomorphism, E pk *
Note that the computation is possible because we assume the encryption E pk * B (·) is privacy homomorphic with respect to the watermark embedding operation ⊕. Alice stores (X , V, σ, m, ν) in T able x as record, and delivers the encrypted content of X to Bob. Bob obtains the watermarked content X by decryption
Identification and arbitration protocol
The identification and arbitration protocol, executed among the seller Alice, the judge J, and the GM, is depicted in Fig. 3 . Once a pirated copy Y of X is found, Alice extracts the watermark U from Y , and correlates U with every W pub in T able x to choose the record with the highest correlation. Then Alice sends the related record together with the original content X to the judge J.
If the buyer's signature ν provided by Alice is verified, J sends E esc to the GM. Otherwise, the protocol halts. The GM recovers the buyer's private key by decrypting the escrow cipher sk * B = D skGA (E esc ), and sends the encrypted value E pkJ (sk * B ) to J. J recovers the private key and watermark by decryption sk * B = D skJ (E pkJ (sk * B )) and W = D sk * B (ew). Next, J extracts a watermark σ(W ) from Y . If σ(W ) and σ(W ) match with a high correlation, the suspected buyer is proven to be guilty. Note that until now, the buyer has stayed anonymous. To recover the buyer's identity, J sends a court order to the GM with the buyer's group signature µ. The GM accesses the registration table Reg to open the group signature using its opening key ok, and obtains the identity B and a claim proof τ . If the GM's claim is verified, J closes the case and adjudicates that the buyer Bob with identity B is guilty. Otherwise, the protocol halts.
Security analysis and discussions
In this section, we analyze the security properties of the proposed protocol. The soundness and completeness of the protocol rely on the security and robustness of the underlying cryptographic and watermarking primitives. Traceability. The copyright violator can be traced and identified by the seller with the help of the judge and the GM, due to the traceability property of the underlying group signature scheme. Non-framing (buyer's security). Alice only knows X and the encrypted content E pkB * (X ), but not Bob's watermark W nor Bob's anonymous private key sk B . Therefore, Alice doesn't know the watermarked content X , and cannot frame Bob by distributing replicas of X . That is, the customer's rights problem is solved. The unbinding problem is solved as follows. If Alice obtained a copy of X sold to Bob as Y = X ⊕ V ⊕ σ(W ), she could compute W anyway since she knows X and σ, and could insert the extracted σ(W ) to another digital content U to fabricate a pi-
Group manager (GM) The opening algorithm to generate an identity with a proof of the claim Judge
The judge algorithm to verify that certain group member produced a signature with a proof rated copy U . Even if this fabricated piracy was possible, Alice could't forge Bob's signature ν that explicitly binds E pk * B (W ), pk * B to ARG, which in turn binds to a particular transaction with specifications of X. Moreover, since Bob's anonymous key (pk * B , sk * B ) is one-time, it is infeasible for Alice to transplant the watermark embedded in a pirated copy into another higher-priced content. Non-repudiation (seller's security). Bob only knows his watermark W but not the permutation function σ nor the original content X. Therefore, Bob cannot remove W from X , neither can he claim that the copy was created by Alice or a security breach of Alice's system, because no one can forge Bob's copy. Conspiracy resistance. Conspiracy attacks are impossible, because Bob generates his watermark and there is no third party involved in the watermark protocol. Dispute resolution. When a dispute occurs, without Bob revealing sk * B and W , the judge can recover sk * B from the GM, with the help of the key escrow cipher E esc and the proof pf sk *
B
. Once sk * B is recovered, the judge recovers W and he can further adjudicate the case. Anonymity. The buyer's anonymity is preserved due to the anonymity property of the underlying group signature scheme. Before the purchase, Bob requests a group signature key gsk B from the GM. Note that the GM is trustworthy, otherwise the group signature scheme would not be secure. In each transaction, Bob provides Alice with his group signature on his anonymous public key pk * B . In case of disputes, Alice sends the transaction information to the judge. It only proves someone with a public key pk
Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the shortcomings of some existing schemes, and proposed an secure and anonymous buyer-seller watermarking protocol. We have improved the protocol's security properties to ensure that the predefined design requirements are fulfilled. We address the importance of anonymity with control in such a way that a buyer can purchase digital contents anonymously (anonymity), but the buyer's anonymity can be revoked as soon as he is adjudicated to be guilty for copyright violation by an arbitrator (dispute resolution). On the other hand, the seller is not able to link data from different transactions and decide whether they are from the same buyer or not (unlinkability), yet the seller can trace and identify copyright violators with the help of a trusted authority (traceability). Comparing with earlier work, our protocol is able to provide all the required security properties such as traitor traceability, buyer anonymity, transaction unlinkability, non-framing, non-repudiation, conspiracy resistance, and dispute resolution.
